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CORN, COWS, AND CLIMATE CHANGE: HOW 
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES ENABLE 
FACTORY FARMING AND EXACERBATE U.S. 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 
Trevor J. Smith* 
Abstract: 
As people around the globe grapple with the realities of an ever-warming 
planet, Americans, too, are coping with some of the attendant consequences of 
climate change: severe droughts, storms, and wildfires to name just a few. In 
response, Americans are evaluating their personal and collective contributions to 
the climate crisis. Notwithstanding President Trump’s unilateral move in June 
2017 to withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement, the international 
community is pressing forward with comprehensive strategies to mitigate 
anthropogenic sources of atmospheric carbon. Despite their best efforts, however, 
most of these actions focus on the energy and transportation sectors while 
largely ignoring the most significant, though lesser acknowledged, climate 
culprit of them all: industrial animal agriculture (or “factory farming”). 
Like many of its international counterparts, the United States currently has 
no broad-based plan to mitigate carbon emissions from its livestock industry. 
However, if Americans can garner the political will to prioritize the climate 
impacts of animal agriculture, any effective emissions-reduction strategy must 
be multi-faceted. The strategy must address the underlying drivers of factory 
farming and not just livestock-related emissions. This necessarily requires an 
overhaul of federal crop subsidies that provide livestock producers with a glut of 
cheap feed grains—corn and soy, specifically—that enable them to produce meat 
well below its true cost. Shifting federal subsidies away from commodity crops 
and toward a broader array of fruits, vegetables, and nuts (or “specialty crops”) 
could level the playing field between commodity crop and specialty crop 
production. Additionally, shifting federal subsidies to specialty crops could 
catalyze a change in consumer choices away from carbon-intensive meat and 
toward more carbon-neutral, plant-based alternatives. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Climate scientists overwhelmingly agree that our planet is 
warming, and that humans are primarily to blame.1 Earth’s 
average temperature increased between 0.4 and 0.8 degrees 
Celsius during the past 100 years.2 As a result, the polar ice 
caps are melting, sea levels are rising, oceans are acidifying, 
habitats are shrinking, and severe weather events are 
intensifying.3 
There are no indications these distressing trends will 
decelerate anytime soon. The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC)—an international body of scientists 
that assesses the research on climate change and advises 
policymakers4—“recently predicted that average global 
                                                 
* Trevor J. Smith, J.D. with a certificate in Environmental Law, 2013, Florida State 
University College of Law; LL.M., Environmental and Natural Resources Law, 2018, 
University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law. I would like to thank Professor 
Arnold Reitze for supervising this article, my classmates in the climate change 
seminar for their constructive feedback, the staff of the Washington Journal of 
Environmental Law & Policy for their work in preparing this piece for publication, and 
my husband, Guy, for his love and support. 
1. Scientific Consensus: Earth’s Climate is Warming, NASA, 
https://climate.nasa.gov/scientific-consensus/ [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/RXJ7-DEKM] (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
2. See Global Warming: News, Facts, Causes & Effects, LIVESCIENCE, 
https://www.livescience.com/topics/global-warming [https://perma.cc/M5JV-EEP4] (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
3. See, e.g., How Climate is Changing, NASA, https://climate.nasa.gov/effects/ 
[https://perma.cc/M74U-MMW8] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019) (detailing some of the 
predicted long-term impacts of climate change, including: lengthened frost-free 
seasons, more droughts and heat waves, stronger and more intense hurricanes, sea 
level rise of one to four feet by 2100, and an ice-free Arctic). 
4. About the IPCC, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
https://www.ipcc.ch/about/ [https://perma.cc/NFG3-KALS] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
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temperatures could increase between 1.4 and 5.8 degrees 
Celsius by the year 2100.”5 In light of this startling prediction, 
the 2015 Paris Agreement, an outgrowth of the original 1992 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC),6 set an ambitious goal of “strengthen[ing] the 
global response to the threat of climate change by keeping a 
global temperature rise this century well below 2 degrees 
Celsius above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to 
limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5 degrees 
Celsius.”7 
The temperature hike over the last fifty years is largely 
attributable to a handful of anthropogenic activities, such as 
the burning of fossil fuels, land clearing, and agricultural 
practices.8 However, despite the efforts of the international 
community to stave off rising temperatures, they have ignored 
the largest contributor of greenhouse gas emissions: animal 
agriculture. Nearly all of the focus has been on reducing 
carbon emissions from the energy and transportation sectors 
while “neglecting agriculture generally and livestock 
production in particular.”9 
In its seminal 2006 report, Livestock’s Long Shadow, the 
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
conducted a broad assessment regarding the magnitude of 
greenhouse gas emissions attributable to livestock 
production.10 “The FAO estimated that livestock production 
was responsible for 18% of global [greenhouse gas emissions] 
                                                 
5. See LIVESCIENCE, supra note 2. 
6. See About the Secretariat, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
SECRETARIAT, https://unfccc.int/about-us/about-the-secretariat 
[https://perma.cc/8W4H-NPXE] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
7. The Paris Agreement, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
SECRETARIAT, https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement 
[https://perma.cc/UT3Q-3CJT] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
8. See LIVESCIENCE, supra note 2. 
9. See Debra L. Donahue, Livestock Production, Climate Change, and Human 
Health: Closing the Awareness Gap, 45 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11112, 11113 
(2015) (citing ROB BAILEY ET AL., CHATHAM HOUSE: ROYAL INST. OF INT’L AFFS., 
LIVESTOCK—CLIMATE CHANGE’S FORGOTTEN SECTOR: GLOBAL PUB. OPINION ON MEAT 
AND DAIRY CONSUMPTION 12 (2014)). 
10. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., LIVESTOCK’S LONG SHADOW: ENVTL. ISSUES 
AND OPTIONS xxi (2006), http://www.fao.org/docrep/010/a0701e/a0701e00.HTM 
[https://perma.cc/D4NM-AUPV] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
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in carbon dioxide equivalent,”11 which may not seem too hefty 
on its face. Importantly, though, livestock accounted for 35-
40% of all anthropogenic sources of methane and 65% of 
nitrous oxide—two highly potent greenhouse gases.12 Based on 
these figures, the report concluded that livestock’s contribution 
to climate change exceeded that of the global transportation 
sector.13 According to the FAO’s more recent calculations from 
2013, total emissions from global livestock represent 14.5% of 
all anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.14 Most scientists 
concur that livestock’s share of total greenhouse gas emissions 
globally is in the 14-18% range.15 
Increasing numbers of scientists warn that in order to avoid 
surpassing the internationally-recognized two-degree 
temperature-rise threshold, nations must make significant 
short-term reductions in all greenhouse gas emissions, with a 
primary focus on reducing methane emissions from livestock 
production.16 Despite this clarion call, of the 40 developed 
countries listed under Annex I of the UNFCCC,17 only Bulgaria 
and France had established a quantitative reduction target for 
livestock-related emissions in 2015.18 
Like the vast majority of developed countries, the United 
States also lacks a comprehensive strategy to mitigate 
                                                 
11. Donahue, supra note 9, at 11112 (citing LIVESTOCK’S LONG SHADOW, supra note 
10, at 112, tbl. 3–12 at 113, 114, 272). 
12. See id., supra note 9, at 11112. 
13. See id., supra note 9, at 11112. 
14. Key Facts and Findings, FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., 
http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/197623/icode/ [https://perma.cc/8RHH-2BW4] 
(last visited Mar. 12, 2019). To access the full 2013 report, Tackling Climate Change 
Through Livestock: A Global Assessment of Emissions and Mitigation Opportunities, 
see http://www.fao.org/3/a-i3437e.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7D6-EVZU]. 
15. See Donahue, supra note 9, at 11113. 
16. See id., supra note 9, at 11113. 
17. See id., supra note 9, at 11113. The UNFCCC divides countries into three main 
groups—Annex I, Annex II, and Non-Annex 1 Parties—according to differing 
commitments. Annex I Parties include the industrialized countries that were members 
of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development in 1992, plus 
countries with economies in transition, including the Russian Federation, the Baltic 
States, and several Central and Eastern European States. See Parties and Observers, 
U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE SECRETARIAT, 
https://unfccc.int/parties-observers [https://perma.cc/D4YC-QBGQ] (last visited Mar. 
12, 2019). 
18. See Donahue, supra note 9, at 11113. 
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emissions from animal agriculture. Livestock is the number 
one source of methane emissions in this country, and “[c]attle 
are the main contributor to the [livestock] sector’s [greenhouse 
gas] emissions.”19 Despite this reality, the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has been severely 
underestimating livestock-related emissions. Livestock 
operations across the country reportedly emit almost twice 
what the EPA attributes to them in its recent inventories.20 To 
its credit, the EPA maintains a list of voluntary measures the 
livestock industry can employ to reduce its carbon footprint.21  
But voluntary action is no substitute for comprehensive 
federal regulation. If the United States and other nations do 
not begin to implement stringent regulatory schemes aimed at 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions from livestock, scientists 
warn that agriculture-related emissions alone will almost 
reach the full two-degree target emissions allowance by 2050.22 
The U.N. cautions that “even with ambitious supply-side 
mitigation in the agricultural sector, without radical shifts in 
the consumption of meat and dairy products, growth in 
agricultural emissions will leave insufficient space within a 
two-degree carbon budget for other sectors”23 like energy or 
transportation. Although it is theoretically possible to 
decarbonize energy supply, complete reductions are not 
feasible in the livestock part of the agricultural sector because 
of the biological realities of ruminant digestion—farm animals 
release excessive amounts of methane. (See infra Part I.) 
Therefore, to achieve significant reductions in emissions from 
animal agriculture, we must focus on demand-side reductions 
by encouraging greater consumption of a diverse array of 
                                                 
19. See id., supra note 9, at 11113 (citing Pierre J. Gerber et al., Food & Agric. Org. 
of the United Nations, Tackling Climate Change Through Livestock: A Global 
Assessment of Emissions and Mitigation Opportunities 15 (2013)). 
20. See Scot M. Miller et al., Anthropogenic Emissions of Methane in the United 
States., 110 PROCS. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 20018, 20020, 20022 (2013). 
21. See Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions 
[https://perma.cc/2PCA-FCP9] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
22. See Donahue, supra note 9, at 11114 (citing Bojana Bajzelj et al., Importance of 
Food-Demand Mgmt. for Climate Mitigation, 4 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 924, 924 
(2014)). 
23. Id. (quoting BAILEY ET AL., supra note 10, at 12). 
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specialty crops24—like fruits, vegetables, and nuts—and other 
plant-based foods. 
In the following sections, I provide a general overview of 
greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture and livestock 
production in the United States, explaining why the animal 
agriculture sector is the leading source of greenhouse gas 
emissions. I then examine the multibillion-dollar federal 
agricultural subsidies programs, which have led to the cost of 
meat being artificially low and have prioritized commodity 
crop production—the vast majority of which is used as 
livestock feed—over other fruits and vegetables. This is the 
result of efforts by the agribusiness lobby that has 
commandeered a once well-intentioned welfare program for 
small farmers. Finally, I suggest that one potential way to 
mitigate livestock-related emissions in the United States is to 
redirect federal agricultural subsidies, particularly crop 
insurance subsidies, away from industrial commodity crops 
and toward a broader array of fruits, vegetables, and specialty 
crops. In theory, allowing these specialty crops to fairly 
compete in the market could, in turn, encourage consumers to 
buy more affordable—and less carbon-polluting—fruits and 
vegetables while simultaneously weaning themselves off of 
commodity-crop fed and more carbon-intensive meat. 
I.  GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM AMERICAN 
ANIMAL AGRICULTURE 
Agriculture is the largest use of land in the United States.25 
A 2012 study from the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) estimated that land used for agricultural 
purposes, including cropland, grassland pasture and range, 
                                                 
24. See generally § 101 of the Specialty Crops Competitiveness Act of 2004, 7 U.S.C. 
§ 1621, and amended under § 10010 of the Agricultural Act of 2014, Public Law 113–
79 (the “Farm Bill”), defines specialty crops as “fruits and vegetables, tree nuts, dried 
fruits, horticulture, and nursery crops (including floriculture)”. For a full list of 
specialty crops, see What is a Specialty Crop?, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 
https://www.ams.usda.gov/services/grants/scbgp/specialty-crop 
[https://perma.cc/4MCB-8P4C] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
25. DANIEL P. BIGELOW & ALLISON BORCHERS, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., MAJOR USES OF 
LAND IN THE UNITED STATES, 2012, at 3, 4 (2017), 
https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/84880/eib-178.pdf?v=0 
[https://perma.cc/K78C-LWU9] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
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grazed forestland, land in farmsteads, and the area occupied 
by farm roads and lanes, totaled 1.18 billion acres, or 52.5% of 
the United States’ total landmass and about 63% of the 
landmass in the lower 48 states.26 Of the country’s 2.3 billion 
total acres, roughly 380 million acres are used as cropland, 655 
million acres as grassland pasture and range, and 130 million 
acres as grazed forestland.27 Because of agriculture’s dominant 
footprint across the national landscape, even relatively minor 
changes in agricultural practices when broadly implemented 
can have substantial impacts on the sector’s overall 
contribution to climate change. 
The EPA estimates that emissions from agriculture account 
for nearly 8% of annual U.S. greenhouse gas emissions.28 At 
first glance, this may appear rather insignificant, particularly 
when juxtaposed with energy-related activities, including 
electricity generation and transportation. Indeed, the energy 
and transportation sectors are the primary sources of the 
country’s anthropogenic greenhouse gases, accounting for over 
84% of total emissions.29 But upon closer inspection, 
agriculture is the primary climate-impacting culprit because of 
the outsized radiative effects of methane and nitrous oxide as 
compared to carbon dioxide. This may come as a surprise to 
many Americans. 
While energy-related activities primarily emit carbon 
dioxide through the burning of fossil fuels, “crop and livestock 
greenhouse gas emissions consist largely of nitrous oxide and 
methane,” both of which are notoriously potent greenhouse 
gases.30 The average global warming potential of nitrous oxide 
and methane is, respectively, 265-298 times and 28-36 times 
that of carbon dioxide over 100 years.31 Thus, while the energy 
                                                 
26. See id. 
27. Id. at 4 tbl. 1 (Agricultural and nonagricultural uses of U.S. land, 2012). 
28. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 
AND SINKS, 1990–2015, at 5–1 (2017), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-
02/documents/2017_complete_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/42QY-SXVT] (last visited 
Mar. 12, 2019). 
29. Id. at 3–1. 
30. See Peter Lehner & Nathan A. Rosenberg, Legal Pathways to Carbon-Neutral 
Agriculture., 47 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10845, 10846 (2017). 
31. Understanding Global Warming Potentials, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/understanding-global-warming-potentials 
[https://perma.cc/MB29-DC6Q] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
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and transportation sectors combined emit 97% of the nation’s 
carbon dioxide,32 their climate change impacts are outweighed 
by the agriculture sector’s contribution of 35% of the nation’s 
methane emissions and 80% of its nitrous oxide emissions.33 
Put into perspective, in 2015, agricultural emissions of 
methane and nitrous oxide were the equivalent of 520 million 
metric tons of carbon dioxide—or the carbon emissions from 
111 million automobiles in an average year.34 
The vast majority of agricultural greenhouse gas emissions 
are inextricably linked to one conspicuously problematic 
behemoth—industrial animal agriculture (also colloquially 
called “factory farms” or “concentrated animal feeding 
operations” (CAFOs) in federal environmental statutes). Meat 
and dairy production account for nearly 80% of all the 
agricultural emissions in the United States.35 According to 
EPA studies, the top three sources of U.S. agricultural 
emissions are (1) soil management, (2) enteric fermentation, 
and (3) manure management,36 which directly or tangentially 
relate to intensive livestock production. 
Soil management generally refers to various practices 
                                                 
32. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 28, at 3–1. 
33. Overview of Greenhouse Gases: Methane Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/overview-greenhouse-gases [https://perma.cc/G65B-
BQV6] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019); Overview of Greenhouse Gases: Nitrous Oxide 
Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/overview-
greenhouse-gases [https://perma.cc/Y4WC-6H26] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
34. See Lehner & Rosenberg, supra note 30 (comparing the EPA’s 2015 inventory of 
greenhouse gas emissions from the agricultural sector with typical passenger vehicles, 
which emit about 4.7 metric tons of carbon dioxide annually); see also Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions from a Typical Passenger Vehicle, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/greenhouse-gas-emissions-typical-passenger-vehicle 
[https://perma.cc/7XUH-DL23] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
35. See Lehner & Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 10848, n.27 (calculating that the 
collective emissions from enteric fermentation, manure management, and nitrous 
oxide emissions from agricultural soils devoted to feed crop production and grazing are 
responsible for 405.1 MMT carbon dioxide eq. annually, or 78% of total U.S. 
agricultural emissions). 
36. See Lehner & Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 10846–47. Agriculture also produces 
carbon dioxide emissions from on-farm fossil fuel combustion and from the energy 
inputs to produce pesticides and fertilizer. See generally CLAUDIA HITAJ & SHELLYE 
SUTTLES, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., TRENDS IN U.S. AGRICULTURE’S CONSUMPTION AND 
PRODUCTION OF ENERGY: RENEWABLE POWER, SHALE ENERGY, AND CELLULOSIC 
BIOMAS (2016), 
https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/74658/60128_eib159.pdf?v=42593 
[https://perma.cc/VH4M-BA6G] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
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designed to improve crop yield—like fertilization—and is 
responsible for “48% of all U.S. agricultural emissions and 93% 
of all U.S. nitrous oxide emissions.”37 From 1990 to 2015, 74% 
of these nitrous oxide emissions came from cropland (as 
opposed to grazed grasslands).38 Notably, over three-quarters 
of all harvested cropland in this country is devoted to feed crop 
production.39 “This cropland is often cultivated more intensely 
than cropland growing human food, with the result that feed 
crop production can emit more nitrous oxide per acre than the 
production of crops for human consumption.”40 
The second largest source is enteric fermentation, which 
accounts for 32% of the nation’s agricultural emissions and 
25% of its total methane emissions.41 Enteric fermentation is 
the scientific term for the normal digestive processes of 
ruminant animals (primarily cows and sheep), during which 
microbes resident in an animal’s digestive system ferment the 
plants and grasses consumed by the animal.42 The 
fermentation process produces methane as a byproduct, which 
the animals “exhale” and “eructate” (or, in pedestrian terms, 
“burp” and “fart”) into the air.43 
Manure management is the third major category, releasing 
approximately two million tons of nitrous oxide and methane 
emissions annually44 and accounting for 16% of the nation’s 
total agricultural emissions.45 Factory farms produce the bulk 
                                                 
37. See Lehner & Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 10846–47 (citing U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, supra note 28, at 5–2, 5–21, 5–22). 
38. See id., supra note 30, at 5–24, tbl. 5–15. 
39. See BIGELOW & BORCHERS, supra note 25, at 20, 24 tbl. 6 (USDA estimated that 
of the 308 million acres of harvested cropland in 2012, approximately 237 million acres 
were used for feed crops, while only about 61 million acres were used for food crops). 
40. See Lehner & Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 10847. 
41. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 28, at 5–2, tbl. 5–1. 
42. See id., supra note 28, at 5–3. 
43. See id. 
44. See R. Jason Richards & Erica L. Richards, Cheap Meat: How Factory Farming is 
Harming Our Health, the Environment, and the Economy, 4 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC., & 
NAT. RESOURCES L. 31, 41 (2012) (citing DAVID KIRBY, ANIMAL FACTORY: THE 
LOOMING THREAT OF INDUSTRIAL PIG, DIARY, AND POULTRY FARMS TO HUMANS AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT xiv (St. Martin’s Press 2010)). 
45. See Lehner & Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 10847 (citing U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, supra note 28, at 5–2, tbl. 5–1). 
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of these manure-based emissions.46 The numbers could be 
significantly reduced if the livestock were allowed to spread 
out over larger geographic areas and in smaller herds, but that 
practice is not consistent with standard factory farming 
operations.47 Instead, factory farms typically house upwards of 
hundreds of animals in a single shed or warehouse-like 
structure, and the manure is collected in waste “lagoons.”48 
These lagoons produce substantially more emissions than 
would be produced by the same number of animals if they were 
less confined or permitted to freely roam.49 According to the 
EPA, “[w]hen livestock or poultry manure are stored or treated 
in systems that promote anaerobic conditions (e.g., as a 
liquid/slurry in lagoons, ponds, tanks, or pits), the 
decomposition of the volatile solids component in the manure 
tends to produce [methane].”50 Alternatively, the EPA 
recommends as an emissions-reducing measure that manure 
be handled as a solid (e.g., in stacks or drylots) or deposited on 
pasture, range, or paddock lands, as it tends to decompose 
aerobically and produce little or no methane.51 
II.  THE INFLUENCE OF FEDERAL FARM SUBSIDIES ON 
INEXPENSIVE MEAT PRODUCTION 
Meat consumption in the U.S. is expected to rise through 
2019.52 According to data from the USDA’s National 
Agricultural Statistics Service, the average American 
consumer ate 217.75 pounds of red meat and poultry in 2018,53 
                                                 
46. See Lehner & Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 10847. 
47. See Richards & Richards, supra note 44, at 41 (citing KIRBY, supra note 44, at 
xiv, 73). 
48. See id., supra note 44, at 33, 41. 
49. See id., supra note 44, at 41 (citing KIRBY, supra note 44, at 73). 
50. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 28, at 5–9; see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, supra note 21 (providing a caveat that while handling manure as a solid or 
depositing it on pasture rather than storing it in a liquid-based system such as a 
lagoon would likely reduce methane emissions, it may actually increase nitrous oxide 
emissions). 
51. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 28, at 5–9. 
52. See Lester Aldrich, USDA Sees Total Meat Consumption Rising Through 2019, 
ZIA COMMODITIES (May 25, 2018), http://ziacommodities.com/usda-sees-total-meat-
consumption-rising-2019/ [https://perma.cc/PM23-8EUT] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
53. See id. 
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slightly less than the previous record of 221.9 pounds in 2004, 
but far surpassing average consumption 35 years ago at 181.4 
pounds.54 In 2019, “total red meat and poultry consumption 
could rise to 217.78 pounds, a 0.03-pound, or 0.01%, gain from 
[2018].”55 In 2018, domestic meat production surpassed 100 
billion pounds for the first time, “as livestock owners 
expand[ed] their herds on the back of cheap feed grain.”56 
Given America’s swelling appetite for meat, if the country is 
going to make any real progress toward mitigating the 
significant climate-change impacts of animal agriculture, it 
must first address the underlying financial drivers that are 
helping enable the production of inexpensive meat. 
In addition to gaping loopholes in federal environmental and 
animal-protection laws for industrial animal agriculture 
operations,57 some of the primary enablers of factory farming 
are federal agricultural support programs for commodity crops, 
based on the Farm Bill. The Farm Bill is a multi-year, omnibus 
legislation passed roughly every five years that creates and 
reauthorizes federal programs dedicated to, among other 
things, crop insurance, soil conservation, commodity price 
guarantees, and food assistance to low-income earners.58 
Today, the federal government doles out about $20 billion 
annually in “farm safety net” programs, with about 60% of that 
funding devoted to just three commodity crops—corn, 
soybeans, and wheat.59 In short, these federal subsidies 
effectively keep the prices of commodity crops artificially lower 
                                                 
54. See Megan Durisin & Shruti Singh, Americans Will Eat a Record Amount of 
Meat in 2018, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 2, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-02/have-a-meaty-new-year-
americans-will-eat-record-amount-in-2018 (last visited Feb. 13, 2018). 
55. Aldrich, supra note 52. 
56. See Durisin & Singh, supra note 54. 
57. See, e.g., Emily Kenyon, Enough of This Manure: Why the EPA Needs to Define 
the Agricultural Stormwater Exemption to Limit the “Runoff” from the ALT Court, 92 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1187 (2017) (discussing the lax federal regulatory regime of water 
pollution generated on CAFOs); see also Rachel Walker, Blood on the Hands of the 
Federal Government: Affirmative Steps That Promote Animal Cruelty, 4 J. ANIMAL L. & 
ETHICS 183 (2011) (discussing broad exemptions for farm animals in federal cruelty to 
animals statutes). 
58. See generally The 2014 Farm Bill, http://www.thefarmbill.com 
[https://perma.cc/UMX3-N7KC] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
59. See Lehner & Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 10862, 10868. 
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than true market value; farmers are thereby encouraged to 
overproduce, which floods the market and allows livestock 
producers to buy up surplus grains at (or even below) their 
production cost to use as animal feed. Low-cost feed reduces 
production costs for meat and translates to lower prices, 
arguably enticing consumers to buy more affordable meat.60 
To fully understand the current farm subsidies system in 
the United States and its influence on low-cost meat 
production, it must be viewed in its historical context. Federal 
farm support programs began in the late 1920s in response to 
the unstable economic conditions in the agricultural sector 
caused by the Great Depression and the 1930s Dust Bowl.61 
The first iteration of the Farm Bill emerged in the late 1940s 
during the post-World War II economic boom. Two decades 
later, at the behest of the newly emerged agribusiness lobby, 
Congress dramatically expanded the subsidies program to 
include direct price deficit payments.62 Below is a synopsis of 
some of the key developments in the history of agricultural 
subsidies over the past 90 years. The section highlights some 
of the major policy shifts that have essentially handed 
industrial farming—and, thereby, industrial animal 
agriculture—the economic advantage over smaller, less 
intensive, and less polluting farms and producers. 
A.  The Great Depression and the New Deal 
During the 1920s, “[t]he farm crisis was ‘triggered not by too 
little food, but by too much.’”63 Overplanting, coupled with 
advances in mechanization and soil input, led to vast 
                                                 
60. Notably, though, artificially depreciated feed costs are countered by the increase 
in corn and soybean costs associated with conversion to biofuel. See Arnold W. Reitze, 
Jr., Biofuel and Advanced Biofuel, 33 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 309, 333–334 (2015) 
(noting that “[t]he mandated use of ethanol for fuel and the billions of dollars provided 
in government subsidies benefits the corn producers and to a lesser extent soybean 
farmers, but livestock and poultry farmers complain that the demand for corn-based 
ethanol increases their costs for feed corn”). 
61. See Anthony Kammer, Cornography: Perverse Incentives and the United States 
Corn Subsidy, 8 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 1, 8 (2012). 
62. Id. at 13. 
63. William S. Eubanks II, A Rotten System: Subsidizing Environmental 
Degradation and Poor Public Health with Our Nation’s Tax Dollars, 29 STAN. ENVTL. 
L. J. 213, 218 (2009) (quoting DANIEL IMHOFF, FOOD FIGHT: THE CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO 
THE NEXT FOOD AND FARM BILL, 33 (Watershed Media 2007)). 
12
Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol9/iss1/3
  
38 WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 9:1 
 
overproduction of most crops, and prices began to dramatically 
fall.64 In response, Congress first approved large-scale direct 
subsidies to farmers in 1929 with the passage of the 
Agricultural Marketing Act.65 In an effort to stave off a 
deflationary spiral of food prices, the Act authorized the newly 
created Federal Farm Board to spend $500 million to stabilize 
prices through direct lending to farmers and government buy-
outs of surplus crops.66 Ultimately, the bill was unable to stop 
crop prices from falling; by 1933, “the price of corn registered 
at zero and grain elevators refused to buy any surplus corn.”67 
In 1933, as part of President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal 
agenda, Congress passed the Agricultural Adjustment Act. The 
Act set mandatory price supports for corn, cotton, and wheat 
that offered farmers government-sponsored loans to make up 
the difference between production costs and market prices, 
“making sure the price of a commodity never deviated too far 
from its parity price relative to farmers’ expenses.”68 In 
addition, the Act authorized the government “to extend loans 
to farmers to grow additional staple commodities, such as corn, 
during good years,” which the government would store and 
release later when crop yields were low.69 The Supreme Court 
struck down parts of the 1933 Act, but Congress passed the 
1938 Agriculture Adjustment Act after President Roosevelt’s 
infamous 1937 court-packing plan, successfully instituting the 
farm subsidy policies first introduced in the 1933 legislation.70 
Importantly, the 1938 Act established the basic framework for 
all subsequent Farm Bills and is still the prominent policy 
backdrop for current commodity programs and farm income 
supports.71 
                                                 
64. See id. at 218–19. 
65. See Kammer, supra note 61, at 9. 
66. See id. 
67. See Eubanks, supra note 63, at 219. 
68. Kammer, supra note 61, at 10. 
69. Id. 
70. See id. 
71. See Kammer, supra note 61, at 11; see also Eubanks, supra note 63, at 221–22. 
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B.  The Post-War Rise of the Multi-Year Farm Bill and the Big 
Ag Lobby 
In the initial post-World War II years, federal farm policy 
continued to focus on combating rural poverty and mitigating 
the inclination for overproduction in impoverished agricultural 
communities.72 To achieve those goals, Congress continued to 
appropriate funding “through a combination of direct 
assistance programs, subsidies for farmers who agreed to take 
land out of production, and by making farm credit more readily 
available.”73 However, in the decades that followed the War, 
many of the original “programs designed to save the family 
farm had the unintended consequence of lavishing the greatest 
benefits on the largest producers.”74  Smaller farms were 
increasingly consolidated into “larger, more industrial 
operations.”75 Between 1945 and 1970 the total number of 
farms in United States precipitously dropped from nearly 6 
million to around 2.5 million.76 Meanwhile, the average farm 
size more than doubled.77 
The sharp decline of small farms in the post-war decades 
can be traced to the concomitant scientific advances in 
agriculture during that same period. Specifically, the huge 
strides in plant-breeding/hybridization technology during the 
Green Revolution78 coupled with the development of new 
pesticides and herbicides during the mid-20th century led to 
increased crop yields and predictably rapid price declines, 
“reminiscent of the farm crisis during the Great Depression.”79  
However, during this newer farm crisis the government did not 
                                                 
72. See Kammer, supra note 61, at 11. 
73. Id. 
74. Eubanks, supra note 63, at 221–22 (quoting DENNIS KEENEY & LONI KEMP, INST. 
FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POL’Y’, A NEW AGRICULTURAL POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES 8 
(2003)). 
75. See Kammer, supra note 61, at 11. 
76. See The Number of Farms Has Leveled Off at About 2.05 Million, U.S. DEP’T OF 
AGRIC. (2017), https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/chart-gallery/gallery/chart-
detail/?chartId=58268 [https://perma.cc/KLM3-FWN5] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
77. See id. 
78. For a brief synopsis of the Green Revolution, see Green Revolution, THE ENVTL. 
LITERACY COUNCIL, https://enviroliteracy.org/food/food-production-supply/green-
revolution/ [https://perma.cc/695X-K7Y9] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
79. See Eubanks, supra note 63, at 222. 
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step in to protect the small farmers. Instead, the newly 
established large, industrial farms were able to weather the 
depressed market while further consolidating their land 
holdings by purchasing foreclosed smaller farms at bargain 
prices.80 
In addition to expanding their financial power in the post-
war decades, these large farms also joined forces with one 
another to create the first agribusiness lobby, and they 
leveraged their new political power to influence the policy 
priorities of the various Farm Bills during this period.81 
The Food and Agriculture Act of 1965 was the first omnibus 
multi-year farm legislation and continues to serve as Congress’ 
basic template for food policy.82 As one legal scholar notes, the 
concept of the multi-year Farm Bill was “to provide policy-
makers with opportunities to make regular, comprehensive 
changes to food and agriculture policy, but instead [it] provided 
more frequent intervals for lobbyists to influence the 
legislation.”83 For example, the 1965 Act established 
mandatory acreage allotments, planting restrictions, and 
marketing quotas,84 all of which disproportionately favored 
large farms. 
C.  The 1970s Food Crisis and the Ensuing Subsidies “Spigot” 
Global crop production severely declined in the early 1970s, 
leading to an international food crisis that set the stage for 
arguably the most significant shift in farm policy since the 
Great Depression.85 Capitalizing on the alarming food 
insecurities worldwide, Congress passed the 1973 Agriculture 
and Consumer Protection Act.86 One of the most notable parts 
of this transformative bill was the creation of a system of 
target prices and deficiency payments, whereby commodity 
producers received direct payments from the federal 
government “anytime the market price fell below the 
                                                 
80. See id. 
81. See id. 
 82. See Kammer, supra note 61, at 13. 
83. Id., supra note 61, at 11. 
84. See Kammer, supra note 61, at 13. 
85. See id., supra note 61, at 14. 
86. See id. 
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Congressionally specified target price.”87 
This new system of price guarantees was one piece of a 
larger policy agenda of the Nixon administration to massively 
expand American commodity production—even to the point of 
overproduction. President Nixon’s Secretary of Agriculture at 
the time, Earl Butz, vociferously advocated for farmers to “get 
big or get out” and to “plant from fencerow to fencerow”,88 
“arguing that overproduction and a resultant drop in the price 
of commodity grains would increase exports” abroad.89 While 
subsidies had been included in every Farm Bill since its first 
iteration in 1933, the dramatic change under the 1973 Act 
from loans to deficiency payments was “‘revolutionary’” 
because “‘the new subsidies encouraged farmers to sell their 
[commodity crops] at any price, since the government [and 
thus taxpayers] would make up the difference.’”90 
Agribusiness specifically lobbied for the shift to deficiency 
payments with the express goal of “ensur[ing] a steady supply 
of cheap commodity crops that they could trade internationally 
and process into value-added products”91 like ethanol or high-
fructose corn syrup.92 With this major agribusiness-friendly 
shift firmly enshrined in federal legislation by 1973, some of 
the largest “grain processors, namely Cargill and Archer 
Daniels Midland (ADM), exerted considerable influence over 
the Farm Bill drafting process and actually wrote large 
industry-favorable portions of the Farm Bills in the 1980s.”93 
Indeed, deficiency payments for covered commodity crops—i.e., 
corn, soy, and wheat—remained a central component of every 
subsequent Farm Bill through its 2008 iteration. 
The 2002 and 2008 Farm Bills built upon the Nixon 
administration’s original model and offered additional support 
to commodity farmers in the form of direct payments.94 On top 
                                                 
87. See Kammer, supra note 61, at 15. 
88. See Eubanks, supra note 63, at 224 (citing IMHOFF, supra note 63, at 38). 
89. See Kammer, supra note 61, at 15. 
90. See Eubanks, supra note 63, at 226 (quoting MICHAEL POLLAN, THE OMNIVORE’S 
DILEMMA: A NATURAL HISTORY OF FOUR MEALS 52 (The Penguin Press 2006)). 
91. Eubanks, supra note 63, at 226 (quoting IMHOFF, supra note 63, at 39). 
92. See Kammer, supra note 61, at 15, 24. 
93. Eubanks, supra note 63, at 226 (citing IMHOFF, supra note 63, at 39 (“Cargill and 
Archer Daniels Midland were essentially writing the Farm Bills.”)). 
94. See Kammer, supra note 61, at 20. 
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of the deficiency payments that had been carried over into 
every Farm Bill since 1973, these direct payments handed 
commodity producers an additional fixed amount on a per-
bushel basis, regardless of annual fluctuations in price or 
yield.95 That is, the government guaranteed to pay farmers a 
certain, fixed amount “regardless of how much they actually 
planted or how much they would sell their crops for.”96 For 
example, even if market prices rose above the Congressionally 
established floor, under the 2002 Farm Bill, “farmers were 
guaranteed $2.60 from 2002-03 and $2.63 from 2004-2007 per 
bushel of corn under the deficiency payment system, on top of 
which they would receive an additional direct payment[] of 28 
cents per bushel.”97 So if a bushel of corn in 2007 sold for $2.50, 
the farmer would receive an additional $0.41 per bushel from 
the government—a deficiency payment of 13 cents, plus a 
direct payment of 28 cents per bushel. 
All told, through the early 2000s, when the deficiency and 
direct payments were added to the other commodity subsidies 
like the marketing loan program and crop insurance program 
(see infra Part II.d.1), the federal agricultural support system 
cost taxpayers billions of dollars.98 Shockingly, in a single 
decade between 1997 and 2006, American taxpayers spent 
$172 billion on commodity subsidies.99 And even more 
surprising, agribusiness continued to receive billions in tax 
dollars despite earning record profits at their megafarms: “[i]n 
2005 alone, when pretax farm profits were at a near-record $72 
billion, the federal government handed out more than $25 
billion in aid [to big farms], almost 50 percent more than the 
amount it [paid] to families receiving welfare [in the United 
States that year].”100 
                                                 
95. See Kammer, supra note 61, at 21–22. 
96. Brad Plumer, The $956 Billion Farm Bill, In One Graph, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 
2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/01/28/the-950-billion-
farm-bill-in-one-chart/?utm_term=.413d5cf78ef1 [https://perma.cc/2ERF-HDX7] (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
97. Kammer, supra note 61, at 22. 
98. See Eubanks, supra note 63, at 227. 
99. Dan Morgan et al., Farm Program Pays $1.3 Billion to People Who Don’t Farm, 
WASH. POST, July 2, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/07/01/AR2006070100962.html [https://perma.cc/TG5Q-L2ZJ] 
(last visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
100. Id. 
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D.  Current Farm Bill Programs: The “Farm Safety Net” 
The most recent iteration of the Farm Bill—the Agriculture 
Act of 2014 (more commonly referred to as the 2014 Farm 
Bill)—made some modest cutbacks in agricultural subsidies 
but still appropriated over $134 billion for crop insurance and 
commodity programs over the next 10 years.101 Notably, meat 
producers do not receive any direct financial support under the 
2014 Farm Bill (and did not under the pre-2014 program), but 
they remain eligible for emergency and disaster relief,102 which 
totaled $9.8 billion from 1995 to 2016.103 Ninety billion dollars 
was allotted for crop insurance—$7 billion more than the 
previous law’s allocation; meanwhile, $44.4 billion was 
earmarked for commodity programs—$14 billion less than 
before.104 Even more federal money was appropriated in the 
2014 Farm Bill for subsidized loans to commodity farmers.105 
Collectively, these federal support programs are referred to as 
the “farm safety net”.106 Each of these three categories—crop 
insurance, commodity programs, and the marketing loan 
program—is examined in turn below. 
1.  Crop Insurance 
The bulk of the subsidies for “farm safety net” programs go 
to crop insurance. For decades, farmers have been able to buy 
federally subsidized crop insurance in case their crops fail or 
prices abruptly decline. The 2014 Farm Bill expanded the crop 
insurance subsidies by adding $7 billion to prior allocation in 
                                                 
101. See Plumer, supra note 96. 
102. See Donahue, supra note 9, at 11119 (citing DENNIS A. SHIELDS, CONG. RES. 
SERV., FARM COMMODITY PROVISIONS IN THE 2014 FARM BILL (P.L. 113–79) (2014). 
103. See EWG’s Farm Subsidy Database, ENVTL. WORKING GRP., 
https://farm.ewg.org/progdetail.php?fips=00000&progcode=total_lea&regionname=the
UnitedStates [https://perma.cc/P5SJ-6SE2] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
104. See Plumer, supra note 96. 
105. Id. 
106. See Lehner & Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 10862. The “farm safety net” also 
includes conservation payments, which are outside the scope of this paper. The 2014 
Farm Bill budgeted $57.6 billion over ten years for conservation—$4 billion less than 
the previous law. See Plumer, supra note 96. In short, conservation programs are 
designed to pay farmers to grow on less land and “to help [them] protect against soil 
erosion and to use ecologically friendly methods like drip irrigation.” Plumer, supra 
note 96. 
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order to cover “the deductibles that farmers have to pay before 
the insurance kicks in.”107 Additionally, the federal 
government agreed to pay 65% of the farmers’ insurance 
premiums.108 
The two primary categories of crop insurance are yield 
protection and revenue protection.109 As their names suggest, 
“[y]ield protection covers farmers when their yield falls below a 
certain percentage of the expected yield,” as calculated from 
historical yields, while “[r]evenue protection covers farmers if 
their revenue falls below a certain percentage of expected 
revenue”.110 The lion’s share of federal spending on crop 
insurance premium subsidies supports revenue protection 
plans.111 “For example, $5.5 billion of the $6.7 billion spent on 
subsidies in 2012 was for revenue protection premium 
subsidies.”112 Notably, only a handful of select crops qualify for 
revenue protection insurance.113 
While “[p]roponents of the current crop insurance system 
often portray it as a safety net for farmers in the case of 
natural disaster”, it goes well beyond that.114 “[I]n addition to 
protecting farmers from crop losses—routine or not—its use of 
revenue guarantees also ensures that covered crops” like corn, 
wheat, and soybeans remain profitable despite a drop in 
prices.115 Moreover, relying on a study by the American 
Enterprise Institute (AEI),116 the Environmental Working 
                                                 
107. See Plumer, supra note 96. 
108. Tamar Haspel, Farm Bill: Why Don’t Taxpayers Subsidize the Foods That are 
Better for Us?, WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/food/farm-bill-why-dont-taxpayers-subsidize-
the-foods-that-are-better-for-us/2014/02/14/d7642a3c-9434-11e3-84e1-
27626c5ef5fb_story.html?utm_term=.143a64eb6037 [https://perma.cc/UCW7-K9HB] 
(last visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
109. Ann Jaworski, Encouraging Climate Adaptation Through Reform of Federal 
Crop Insurance Subsidies, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1684, 1691 (2016). 
110. Id. at 1691–92. 
111. See id. at 1692. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. Lehner & Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 10862. 
115. Id. 
116. See Anton Bekkerman et al., Where the Money Goes: The Distribution of Crop 
Insurance and Other Farm Subsidy Payments, AM. ENTER. INST. (Jan. 9, 2018), 
https://www.aei.org/publication/where-the-money-goes-the-distribution-of-crop-
insurance-and-other-farm-subsidy-payments/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
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Group (EWG) argues that a disproportionate amount of these 
crop insurance subsidies go to the wealthiest farm operators.117 
AEI reports that “[t]he top 10 percent of farms,” measured by 
crop sales, “received almost 70 percent of all crop insurance 
subsidies,” and “[t]he top 2 percent received 30 percent of all 
premium subsidies—about $50 an acre, or four times more 
than the average crop insurance subsidy recipient receives.”118 
And “[u]nlike traditional commodity subsidies, there are no 
payment limits, means testing or transparency requirements 
for recipients of crop insurance subsidies.”119 As EWG argues, 
“[t]his means that growers and farm businesses can receive 
unlimited taxpayer subsidies via the crop insurance program 
even if they are billionaires.”120 
2.  Commodity Programs 
“This section [of the 2014 Farm Bill] includes a variety of 
programs to shield [commodity] farmers against sharp 
fluctuations in [corn, wheat, and soybean] prices.”121 The most 
prominent policy change for commodity programs in 2014 was 
the elimination of fixed direct payments (as described 
above).122 In place of direct payments, the Farm Bill boosted 
the variable payments to farmers and landowners “when crop 
prices or revenue declines.”123 Farmers must “choose between 
Price Loss Coverage (PLC) and Agricultural Risk Coverage 
(ARC) and receive payments when price (for PLC) or revenue 
(for ARC) drops below” the Congressionally set threshold.124 
Together, PLC and ARC distribute “more than $4 billion each 
                                                 
117. Scott Faber, Have Farmers Been Forgotten by Washington?, ENVTL. WORKING 
GRP. (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.ewg.org/agmag/2018/01/have-farmers-been-forgotten-
washington#.WpICGyPMwWo [https://perma.cc/XCM8-2VST] (last visited Mar. 12, 
2019). 
118. Id. 
119. Colin O’Neil, Are Billionaires Getting Crop Insurance Subsidies? We Still Don’t 
Know, ENVTL. WORKING GRP. (Apr. 28, 2016), https://www.ewg.org/agmag/2016/04/are-
billionaires-getting-crop-insurance-subsidies-we-still-don-t-know#.WpIEkCPMwWo 
[https://perma.cc/EEY5-TS4P] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
120. Id. 
121. Plumer, supra note 96. 
122. See SHIELDS, supra note 102, at 1. 
123. Id. 
124. Haspel, supra note 108. 
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year” to farmers.125 
3.  Marketing Loan Program 
The 2014 Farm Bill also continued a marketing assistance 
loan program.126 This program has been “[a] key part of federal 
farm subsidies since the New Deal” era.127 It was initially 
designed to give farmers “short-term financing to pay farm 
expenses before crops were sold”, but even the CATO Institute, 
a self-branded libertarian think tank,128 once concluded that 
“[the marketing assistance loan program] has morphed into 
simply another multi-billion-dollar subsidy program.”129 
“Under the original system, the government extended loans to 
farmers to allow them to pay operational expenses before 
harvest, and after the crops were sold, farmers would then 
repay the government.”130 However, because the only penalty 
farmers faced for not repaying the loans was that they had to 
forfeit their crops to the government, over time farmers 
stopped repaying during years when crop prices were low.131 
Furthermore, “[o]n top of this de facto subsidy, taxpayers also 
bear the expense of maintaining the government’s commodity 
stockpiles.”132 Between 1995 and 2010, these programs cost 
taxpayers an estimated $77.1 billion in additional subsidies to 
commodity farmers, averaging about $4.8 billion in annual 
transfers to corn producers alone.133 
                                                 
125. Lehner & Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 10863. 
126. Donahue, supra note 9, at 11119. 
127. Kammer, supra note 61, at 23. 
128. CATO’s Mission, CATO INST., https://www.cato.org/mission 
[https://perma.cc/R4W6-ZMCX] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
129. CHRIS EDWARDS & TAD DEHAVEN, FARM SUBSIDIES AT RECORD LEVELS AS 
CONGRESS CONSIDERS NEW FARM BILL, CATO INST. 6 (Oct. 18, 2001), 
https://object.cato.org/pubs/briefs/bp70.pdf. 
130. Kammer, supra note 61, at 23–24. 
131. See id., supra note 61, at 24. 
132. Id. 
133. See id. (citing EWG’s Farm Subsidy Database, ENVTL. WORKING GRP., 
http://farm.ewg.org/ [https://perma.cc/PVP3-B32K]) (last visited Mar. 13, 2019). 
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III.  MAKING THE CONNECTION: COMMODITY 
SUBSIDIES AND CHEAP MEAT 
Industrial animal agriculture facilities have been some of 
the biggest indirect beneficiaries of our nation’s commodity 
crop subsidies. In his book Meatonomics, economist David 
Simon aptly summarizes the direct nexus between federal 
commodity subsidies and cheap-meat production: 
It may come as little surprise, but the handful of 
farmers who consistently harvest the most greenbacks 
from crop subsidies, research shows, are livestock 
producers. The reason: corn and soybeans are the main 
items on the menus for livestock, accounting for the 
majority of feed ingredients in factory farms (where 
virtually all [U.S.] farm animals are raised). This 
makes factory farms the biggest consumers of these 
subsidized commodities, and they buy most of the corn 
and soybeans grown in the United States.134 
The sheer volume of meat generated by factory farms in this 
country is staggering. An estimated 82% of cattle currently 
sold in the United States are raised on feedlots135 (i.e, on 
“factory farms”)136, and the total number of farm animals being 
housed at these industrial facilities has been steadily 
increasing over the past few decades. Between 2002 and 2012, 
the number of livestock animals on the largest factory farms 
                                                 
134. DAVID ROBINSON SIMON, MEATONOMICS: HOW THE RIGGED ECONOMICS OF MEAT 
AND DAIRY MAKE YOU CONSUME TOO MUCH—AND HOW TO EAT BETTER, LIVE LONGER, 
AND SPEND SMARTER 81 (Conari Press 2013). 
135. NAT’L AGRIC. STAT. SERV., CATTLE: JANUARY 1 CATTLE INVENTORY UP 1 
PERCENT, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ’1 (Jan 31, 2018), 
https://downloads.usda.library.cornell.edu/usda-
esmis/files/h702q636h/c534fr214/z316q364w/Catt-01-31-2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QT8T-RW6L]. 
136. A “factory farm” is another term for a large concentrated animal feeding 
operation (CAFO). According to the USDA’s definition, “[a] CAFO is an [animal 
feeding operation] with more than 1000 animal units (an animal unit is defined as an 
animal equivalent of 1000 pounds live weight and equates to 1000 head of beef cattle, 
700 dairy cows, 2500 swine weighing more than 55 lbs., 125 thousand broiler chickens, 
or 82 thousand laying hens or pullets) confined on site for more than 45 days during 
the year.” Animal Feeding Operations, NAT. RES. CONSERVATION SERV., U.S. DEP’T. OF 
AGRIC., 
https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/plantsanimals/livestock/afo/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y9BS-XYGZ] (last visited Mar. 13, 2019). 
22
Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol9/iss1/3
  
48 WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 9:1 
 
rose by 20%, while “[t]he total number of livestock units137 on 
factory farms increased from 23.7 million in 2002 to 28.5 
million in 2012.”138 More specifically, the average size of a 
cattle feedlot (with a capacity of 1,000 or more head of cattle) 
increased by 13.7% over a five-year span, from 3,800 in 2007 to 
more than 4,300 in 2012.139 A recent USDA inventory 
estimates that as of January 1, 2018, there were 14 million 
cattle and calves being fattened on feedlots, up 7% from 13.1 
million in 2017, while across the country there were 94.4 
million cattle and calves both on and off feedlots as of January 
1, 2018, up 1% from 93.7 million from 2017.140 
What accounts for this continuous growth? Factory farms 
are able to continue to expand their (already massive) 
production capacities in large part because they save billions of 
dollars each year in operational expenses by purchasing 
heavily subsidized corn and soybeans at prices below what it 
actually costs to grow them.141 Between 1996 and 2005, 
industrial livestock facilities saved an estimated $3.9 billion 
annually by buying discounted feed.142 A 2006 report by the 
Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy estimated that 
poultry and pig producers’ overall costs would be 7 to 10% 
higher if they paid feed farmers the true market price of their 
crops.143 
                                                 
137. “A ‘livestock unit’ is a way to measure different kinds of animals on the same 
scale based on their weight—one beef cattle is the equivalent of approximately two-
thirds of a dairy cow, eight hogs, or four hundred chickens.” See Factory Farms 
Continue to Dominate U.S. Livestock Industry, FOOD & WATER WATCH (May 27, 2015), 
https://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/news/factory-farms-continue-dominate-us-
livestock-industry [https://perma.cc/X9BJ-B7QR] (last visited Mar. 13, 2019). 
138. See id. 
139. See id. 
140. See NAT’L AGRIC. STAT. SERV., supra note 135, at 1. 
141. See DOUG GURIAN-SHERMAN, CAFOS UNCOVERED: THE UNTOLD COSTS OF 
CONFINED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS 3 (Apr. 
2008), 
https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/food_and_agricultur
e/cafos-uncovered-executive-summary.pdf (estimating that between 1996 and 2005, 
CAFOs saved an average of $3.86 billion each year in feed costs because of federal 
grain subsidies). 
142. See id. at tbl. ES–1 at 6. 
143. R. Dennis Olson, BELOW-COST FEED CROPS: AN INDIRECT SUBSIDY FOR 
INDUSTRIAL ANIMAL FACTORIES, INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POL’Y (June 2006), 
https://www.iatp.org/sites/default/files/258_2_88122_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/DKA6-
Y6GG] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
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While these artificially low feed prices certainly increase 
profit margins for livestock producers, the benefits are also 
passed on to consumers by increasing both the availability and 
affordability of meat.144 For example, McDonald’s sells about 
550 million Big Macs annually in the United States.145 
Meatonomics author David Simon assessed the true price of a 
Big Mac if it included costs taxpayers already contribute 
through federal agricultural subsidies.146 He concluded that 
each burger should cost an additional $0.70—a 15% hike over 
its average retail price in the United States of $4.56 in 2013.147 
IV.  SHIFTING SUBSIDIES TO SPECIALTY CROPS 
As examined above, one of the most glaring problems with 
the Farm Bill is that “[t]axpayers heavily subsidize corn and 
soy, two crops that facilitate the meat and processed food we’re 
supposed to eat less of, and do almost nothing for the fruits 
and vegetables we’re supposed to eat more of.”148 Certainly, 
there is no guarantee that if the federal government stopped 
subsiding commodity crops American consumers would buy 
fewer Big Macs (or meat products in general) just because of a 
modest 70-cent price increase per burger. But perhaps 
consumers would be inclined to opt for less carbon-polluting—
and more nutritious—fruits, vegetables, and grains if these 
foods were also subsidized and could better compete with 
propped up meat products. 
Because most cropland in the United States is not used to 
grow fruits, vegetables, and grains for human consumption, a 
shift in consumer choices regarding meat products could 
                                                 
144. See Kammer, supra note 61, at 27. 
145. Sean Alfano, Big Mac Hits the Big 4-0, CBS NEWS (Aug. 24, 2007), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/big-mac-hits-the-big-4-0/ [https://perma.cc/45CA-TVC5] 
(last visited Mar. 13, 2019). 
146. Each Time McDonald’s Sells a Big Mac, We’re Out $7, MEATONOMICS (2013), 
https://meatonomics.com/2013/08/15/each-time-mcdonalds-sells-a-big-mac-were-out-7/ 
[https://perma.cc/FE3B-LZH2] (last visited Mar. 13, 2019) (citing SIMON, supra note 
134). 
147. Simon argues that a Big Mac’s true cost is $12.00 (250% above its average 
market price of $4.56), which includes an additional $0.38 for animal cruelty, $0.67 for 
environmental losses, $0.70 for agricultural subsidies, and $5.69 for healthcare costs. 
SIMON, supra note 134.. 
148. Haspel, supra note 108. 
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influence farmers’ crop choices.149 “Only about 2 percent of U.S. 
farmland is used to grow [specialty crops], while 59 percent is 
devoted to commodity crops.”150 For example, in 2013, of the 
336 million acres of cropland planted in the U.S., roughly 95 
million acres were used to grow corn.151 And of the corn used 
domestically in 2017, less than 12% was actually used for food, 
seed, and industrial uses, while 44% was used for animal 
feed.152 
In theory, consumer pressure may be able to discourage 
farmers from planting heavily subsidized commodity feed crops 
and, instead, encourage them to grow a broader spectrum of 
specialty crops that could be harvested for direct human 
consumption. A 2013 report from the Union of Concerned 
Scientists “use[d] an economic model developed by Purdue 
University’s Global Trade Analysis Project to predict how U.S. 
farmers would respond to various shifts in eating habits.”153 
The report found “that if Americans ate fruits and vegetables 
at USDA-recommended levels—increasing consumption by 173 
percent over current levels—U.S. farmers would grow 88 
percent more of these foods.”154 “Conversely, if meat and dairy 
consumption fell to levels recommended by the Harvard 
University School of Public Health, farmers would grow less 
corn and other grains used as livestock feed—8 million acres 
less.”155 
                                                 
149. Most domestic cropland is used to grow animal feed. See Jaworski, supra note 
109, at 1703. 
150.  Less Corn, More Fruits and Vegetables Would Benefit U.S. Farmers, Consumers 
and Rural Communities, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Oct. 22, 2013), 
https://www.ucsusa.org/news/press_release/less-corn-more-fruits-and-vegetables-
0378.html#.WsKjNWbMwWo [https://perma.cc/AL7F-PKT3] (last visited Mar. 13, 
2019). 
151. Jaworski, supra note 109, at 1703–04. 
152. Corn Usage by Segment 2017, NAT’L CORN GROWERS ASS’N, 
http://www.worldofcorn.com/#corn-usage-by-segment [https://perma.cc/9W58-GH2B] 
(last visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
153. Less Corn, supra note 150. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. (noting that if beef and dairy consumption fell to recommended levels, 
farmers would grow about 8 million acres less of corn and other feed grains). In 2017, 
beef cows made up 77% of the 41.1 million total cows in the United States: 31.7 million 
beef cows and 9.4 million dairy cows. NAT’L AGRIC. STAT. SERV., supra note 135, at 1. 
By extension then, beef cows consumed roughly three-quarters of all the grains fed to 
cattle, or about 6 of the 8 million total acres-worth feed crops fed to American cattle. 
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Notably, though, “[i]f Americans increased their 
consumption of fruits and vegetables to levels recommended by 
federal dietary guidelines, production of these crops would 
require an additional 13 million acres of [crop]land.”156 While 
at first glance this may seem an impossible task, on closer 
inspection, a modest shift away from commodity crop 
production could result in relatively huge increases in land 
available for fruit and vegetable cultivation. By one estimate, 
“a 1 percent decrease in the 160 million acres of corn and soy 
[would] translate[] to an 11 percent increase in the 14 million 
acres of [agricultural land dedicated to the production of] fruits 
and vegetables.”157 
Shifting production away from feed crops and toward a more 
diverse array of fruits, vegetables, and grains intended for 
human consumption would also help make our food production 
system more efficient at making more calories and protein 
available to a wider mass of people. “[F]eed crop cultivation 
produces more calories per acre than human crop foods, with 
the result that [livestock] eat [nearly] two-thirds of [all] 
calories derived from crops grown in the United States.”158 
“However, only a fraction of those crop calories are delivered to 
humans because, for example, the production of one pound of 
beef from feedlot cattle requires 15-20 pounds of grain.”159 Put 
another way, 
More than one-half of all plant protein in the United 
States is used to feed animals. Only 14% of U.S.-
produced protein is used as human food; 80% is used as 
animal feed. If U.S. consumption of grain-fed animal 
products were cut by 50%, calorie availability would 
increase by enough to feed an additional 2 billion 
people.160 
                                                 
156. Agriculture and Health Policies in Conflict: How Food Subsidies Tax Our 
Health, PHYSICIANS COMM. FOR RESPONSIBLE MED., 
http://www.pcrm.org/health/reports/agriculture-and-health-policies-unhealthful-foods 
(last visited Sep. 15, 2018) (citing Press Release, Am. Farmland Tr., The United States 
Needs 13 Million More Acres of Fruits and Vegetables to Meet the RDA (July 7, 
2010), http://www.farmland.org/news/pressreleases/13-Million-More-Acres.asp). 
157. Haspel, supra note 108 (“Whether that would translate to increased 
consumption is, of course, another question.”). 
158. Lehner & Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 10847. 
159. Id. 
160. Donahue, supra note 9, at 11116 (internal citations omitted). 
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One way to promote the production of a diversity of fruits, 
vegetables, and grains in this country would be for the federal 
government to provide crop insurance subsidies to specialty 
crop growers the way it does for commodity crop producers.161  
The federal crop insurance program applies to over 100 
crops.162 Although “[t]his marks a huge expansion from 1980 
when only twenty-six crops were eligible,”163 economists argue 
that the insurance program is still woefully inadequate to 
catalyze a marked shift toward specialty crop production.164 
According to Vincent Smith, professor of economics at Montana 
State University and a former visiting scholar at AEI, weather 
events pose the greatest risk to specialty crop growers.165 
While many private weather insurance plans currently 
available do cover a wide variety of crops, many farmers do not 
buy these insurance packages because they are not 
subsidized.166 Albeit cautiously optimistic, Smith predicts if the 
federal crop insurance program were expanded to include 
subsidies for specialty crops, “there would be some price 
effect”—but how much would be “[a]nybody’s guess.”167 
Perhaps unexpectedly, mushrooms appear to be one 
specialty crop that shows promise for helping to reduce the 
greenhouse gas emissions associated with meat production and 
could also potentially benefit from an expanded crop insurance 
subsidy program. Fast food chains are experimenting with 
adding mushrooms to their hamburger to boost flavor and 
reduce the amount of meat in each patty. Recently, Sonic 
Drive-In, a fast food chain that has not been widely associated 
with eco-conscious food products, announced that it was adding 
blended beef-mushroom burgers to its menu.168 The company 
                                                 
161. See supra Part II.d.1 for an overview of the crop insurance program. 
162. See RISK MGMT. AGENCY, 2015 COUNTY CROP PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 
https://www.rma.usda.gov/data/cropprograms/2015cropprograms.html (last visited 
Apr. 8, 2018) (most recent listing of the various crops eligible for insurance). Although 
it is called “crop” insurance, the program also covers other aspects of agriculture 
unrelated to growing plants, such as livestock, apiculture (beekeeping), and clams. Id. 
163. Jaworski, supra note 109, at 1690–91. 
164. See Haspel, supra note 108. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
168. See Dan Charles, Here’s Why Environmentalists are Cheering the Latest Burger 
at Sonic Drive-In, NAT’L. PUB. RADIO (Mar. 2, 2018), 
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downplays any potential positive environmental impact, 
emphasizing instead the added flavor and juiciness 
mushrooms provide.169 Even so, “[a]ccording to the World 
Resources Institute, if 30 percent of the beef in every burger in 
America were replaced by mushrooms, it would reduce 
greenhouse emissions by the same amount as taking 2.3 
million vehicles off of our roads.”170 
If Sonic’s beef-mushroom burger sales are strong—because 
of their taste, their eco-friendly appeal, or both—other fast 
food chains will likely start to produce similar products. In 
that case, mushrooms will be in higher demand. Specialty 
farmers would then be incentivized to start producing more 
mushrooms so long as they can adequately minimize their 
risk—crop insurance programs are one of the most effective 
ways to do that. As described supra in Part II.d.1, “there are 
two primary categories of crop insurance: yield protection and 
revenue protection.” In both programs, the federal government 
pays a significant portion of the insurance premiums to 
farmers who produce certain crops. Yield protection is 
designed to protect farmers during low-yield years due to 
weather events like flooding or drought,171 and revenue 
protection ensures farmers are compensated if crop prices drop 
below a predetermined threshold.172 
Because mushrooms are cultivated indoors in controlled 
settings,173 mushroom farmers do not necessarily face the same 
concerns about weather events that other specialty crop 
                                                 
https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2018/03/02/590253046/heres-why-
environmentalists-are-cheering-the-latest-burger-at-sonic-drive-in 
[https://perma.cc/6RAA-9YCU] (last visited Mar. 13, 2018). 
169. See id. 
170. Id. 
171. See ECON. RES. SERV., CROP INSURANCE PROGRAM PROVISIONS–TITLE XI, U.S. 
DEP’T OF AGRIC., https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-economy/farm-commodity-
policy/crop-insurance-program-provisions-title-xi/ [https://perma.cc/JN9X-68HK] (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
172. Jaworski, supra note 109, at 1691–92. 
173. See Roger Morris, The One Tiny Region That Produces Nearly Half of U.S. 
Mushrooms, MODERN FARMER (May 16, 2014), 
https://modernfarmer.com/2014/05/welcome-mushroom-country-population-nearly-
half-u-s-mushrooms/ [https://perma.cc/43B6-M5EM] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019) 
(noting that in the U.S. mushrooms are grown primarily in single-level cinderblock 
buildings—variously called mushroom “barns,” “houses” and “doubles”).  
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farmers might. Therefore, they likely would not benefit from 
being included in the yield protection program. However, 
mushroom farmers could potentially benefit greatly if they 
were able to receive subsidies to cover the premium costs for 
revenue protection insurance. The federal government already 
spends billions of dollars every year subsidizing premiums for 
revenue insurance programs.174 In fact, the vast majority of 
federal spending on crop insurance premium subsidies—$5.5 
billion of the total $6.7 billion in 2012—subsidizes revenue 
protection plans.175 The problem is that none of this money 
goes to support specialty crops. Indeed, only ten commodity 
crops are eligible for revenue protection premium subsidies, 
with corn and soybeans predictably gobbling up nearly two-
thirds of the federal funding.176 
Mushrooms already have a well-established market in the 
United States. In 2017, the domestic mushroom crop capped 
out at $1.22 billion, up 3% from the previous season.177 
Between 2014 and 2017, the average price of mushrooms 
nationwide remained relatively stable at around $1.30 per 
pound.178 But in some parts of the country, the prices fell as 
much $0.18 per pound in a single year, which translated to 
total lost revenue of $35 million in those areas.179 This price 
flux, while seemingly modest, might be alarming enough to 
many mushroom farmers to discourage them from expanding 
their production capacities without revenue protection 
insurance because of the inherent financial risk involved. 
Consider the following hypothetical: If Sonic’s new blended 
                                                 
174. See Jarworski, supra note 109, at 1692. 
175. Id. 
176. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., CROP INSURANCE: CONSIDERATIONS IN 
REDUCING FEDERAL PREMIUM SUBSIDIES 14 (Aug. 2014), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665267.pdf [https://perma.cc/QNL5-WR9W]. The ten 
covered crops, in descending order of total revenue premium subsidies provided, are: 
corn, soybeans, wheat, cotton, grain sorghum, sunflowers, canola, rice, barley, and 
popcorn.  
177. NAT’L AGRIC. STAT. SERV., AGRIC. STAT. BD. & U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 
MUSHROOMS 1 (Aug. 21, 2017), https://downloads.usda.library.cornell.edu/usda-
esmis/files/r781wg03d/1r66j3656/wm117r667/Mush-08-21-2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WB3M-4J2Y]. 
178. Id. 
179. See id. at 4 (showing that the price per pound of mushrooms in “other states” 
dropped from $1.65 to $1.47 between the 2014–2015 and 2015–2016 seasons). 
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mushroom-beef burgers is any indication of rising demand, 
should production rates remain static, it would drive up the 
cost of mushrooms because demand would outpace current 
supply. In turn, fast food chains—and consumers generally—
may not be as inclined to incorporate mushrooms as meat 
substitutes, thereby negating their potential to help mitigate 
U.S. livestock-related greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore, if 
the federal government extended revenue protection premium 
subsidies to include mushrooms, farmers would be incentivized 
to expand production, which could, in turn, help kick start a 
national trend toward reduced meat consumption. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, if the United States is going to contribute to the 
collective international effort to tackle climate change, the 
federal government must develop a comprehensive strategy 
that prioritizes mitigating the impacts of the nation’s 
industrial animal agriculture sector. An effective emissions-
reduction strategy must be multi-faceted and address not just 
livestock-related emissions themselves, but also the underlying 
drivers of factory farming. This necessarily includes 
significantly revising our federal crop subsidies, which are 
providing livestock producers with a seemingly endless supply 
of cheap feed grains and enabling them to produce meat and 
dairy products well below their true cost of production. 
Overhauling the agricultural subsidies programs could level 
the playing field between commodity crop and specialty crop 
production and, in turn, potentially catalyze a much-needed 
shift in consumer choices away from meat and toward more 
plant-based alternatives. 
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